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Modern networked business environment enables design of flexible and effective mechanisms of 
exchange between economic parties. Online negotiations allow geographically and temporally separated 
participants to engage in exchange of offers in search for acceptable agreements. The digital medium 
enables development of software agents, which can assist with negotiation tasks while saving time and 
human effort. The current paper investigates the prospects of utilizing software agents in negotiations 
with the human counterparts. It presents the findings from experiment where human subjects acted as 
buyers negotiating with software agent sellers over a mobile phone plan. An electronic negotiation 
system incorporating software agents was used in the experiment. The agents employed various 
concession-making schedules while engaging in negotiation tasks involving one of two complexity 
levels. Negotiation task complexity was manipulated using different number of issues involved in the 
negotiations. Subjects were recruited among university students. Negotiations between the subjects and 
agents took place during a two-day period in an asynchronous mode through the web. The findings 
suggest that interaction between negotiation task complexity and negotiation tactic has significant 
effects on negotiation outcomes and subjective assessments by the human participants. In particular, task 
complexity had a higher impact on the agreement rate when agents employed a competitive tactic vs. 
when they used a conceding one.  
Keywords: Concession-making, electronic negotiations, experimental studies, mechanism design, 
multi-issue negotiations, negotiations, software agents. 
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Electronic negotiation systems (ENSs) allow parties to exchange offers over the Internet in an 
organized manner, thus facilitating online negotiations (Kersten and Noronha, 1999). Compared with 
generic communication tools, such as e-mail, these systems typically impose a certain structure on the 
process of interaction between the parties, as well as on the format of the offers. Additionally, they can 
provide analytical support for negotiators in the negotiation process. Such support can help ENS users 
formulate their objectives, preferences, reservation levels, and other pertinent aspects which may have 
impact on the negotiation process and outcomes. Nonetheless, negotiations are cognitively challenging 
for humans, as they have to deal with the complexity of the task, while assessing offers, constructing 
counter-offers, and considering acceptance or termination decisions.  
Automating, or assisting the process of exchanging offers can be achieved with the use of software 
agents (SAs). Agents have been utilized in various roles to facilitate e-commerce processes (Yu et al., 
2015). Automating commerce negotiations have long been targeted by the SA research community 
(Maes et al., 1998). Recently, the Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC) has been held 
(Baarslag et al., 2012). The distinguishing feature of employing agents in negotiations is that the 
outcome cannot be predicted in advance, though it can be restricted to a certain set by imposing 
constraints. While, for many tasks, objectives can be either achieved or not, in negotiations the final 
agreement partly depends on the other party’s behavior. In view of this inherent uncertainty in agent-run 
negotiations, assessment of their performance while utilizing various negotiation tactics and strategies is 
an important research objective.  
Despite the above uncertainty, agent-managed negotiations promise a number of important benefits 
(Lin and Kraus, 2010; Yang and Singhal, 2009). First, agent-led negotiation behavior is, in general, 
more consistent than that of the human negotiators. Agents can be designed and instructed to act 
according to specified plans. Provided with the preferences for various negotiation issues, the 
  
reservation levels, and the negotiation tactic, an agent will make decisions in accordance with these 
specifications (although some randomness may be present due to the nature of the decision-making 
algorithm, or it may be introduced intentionally to hide the agent’s inner workings). Second, agents 
would alleviate human effort related to exchanging offers in the negotiation process. Third, they can 
help people with limited negotiation skills to negotiate better. Fourth, they can be active at any time, 
unlike human beings.  
In accordance with a model for comparison of various types of ENSs (Kersten et al., 2006), 
successful use of agents in negotiations can be influenced by a number of factors. These include 
economic outcomes achieved by the agents, as well as the subjective assessments by human counterparts 
of the outcome and the process of negotiations. The current work aims at investigating performance of 
negotiating agents while being paired with human counterparts in experimental settings. SA negotiation 
style and negotiation task complexity have been used as experimental treatments. Their impacts on 
objective outcomes, including agreement rate and agreement utility have been measured. Additionally, 
the effects on subjective variables, including perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use are reported 
in the paper.  An ENS incorporating software agents (Vahidov et al., 2012b) have been used in the 
experiment. The system enables creation of negotiation cases, pairing agent and human participants in 
negotiation dyads, setting up multiple negotiation issues and preference structures, defining negotiation 




Concerning agent involvement in negotiations, there are two major aspects: agent’s negotiation 
tactics/strategies and the role agents play in the negotiation process.  In defining agent behavior the 
negotiation tactics and strategies play the key part. While the terms negotiation tactic and negotiation 
strategy have been used in the past somewhat loosely, in this work we will follow the definitions 
  
provided  by Faratin et al. (1998). According to them a negotiation tactic is used to decide what kind of 
offer to make at a given point in the negotiation process. A negotiation strategy, on the other hand 
dictates the choice of tactics based on negotiation history, context, and other variables. Therefore, a 
strategy can employ multiple tactics.  
Faratin et al. (1998) defined three categories of tactics: behavior-dependent, time-dependent, and 
resource-dependent. Behavior-dependent tactics base the choice of offer on the moves made by the 
parties. The most prominent tactic in this category is “tit-for-tat”, which states that the next concession 
to be made by a party should be proportional, or symmetrical to the one made by the counterpart. The 
second family of tactics employs models on concession-making as a function of time elapsed between 
the beginning of negotiation and the estimated or defined ending point. Curves showing small 
concessions in the beginning correspond to tougher competitive behavior, while those making large 
concessions early model conceding behavior. Resource-dependent tactics adjust concession levels based 
on the scarcity of the resources at any point in the negotiation process.   
Experiments with Kasbah marketplace involving agent-to-agent single issue negotiations adopted 
three time-dependent negotiation tactics (Chavez et al., 1997; Chavez and Maes, 1996). They were 
defined by the shape of the curve dictating how quickly agent would be dropping the price. Tactics can 
also be adjusted in the negotiation process. For example, Cao et al. (2015) have proposed an approach 
where negotiation tactics (curves) can be adjusted as new offers arrive based on the opponent’s 
concession-making rate. Their simulation-based study revealed that adaptive agents outperformed the 
static-tactic agents. 
Regarding agent role in conducting electronic negotiations three categories can be mentioned: (1) 
human-to-human negotiations with agent support; (2) agent-to-agent negotiations featuring full 
automation on both sides, and (3) human-to-agent negotiations, where SAs are paired up with human 
counterparts (Yang and Singhal, 2009). The first category includes use of agents as advisors for assisting 
  
human negotiators to cope with the complexity of negotiation tasks. These agents may help humans to 
stay in line with their defined preference structures and concession-making plans. Examples include 
Aspire agent (Kersten and Lo, 2003) and eAgora marketplace (Chen et al., 2005). The second category 
includes completely automated negotiations on both sides. The current work focuses on the third 
category, agent-to-human negotiations. 
Designing agents that can negotiate with human counter-parts is not a trivial task (Lin and Kraus, 
2010), with most pertinent challenges including bounded rationality and incomplete information. Yang 
and Singhal (Yang and Singhal, 2009) made several suggestions concerning agent tactics, including: 
making a tough initial offer; making simultaneous offers that are of equal value to the agent; making 
monotonously decreasing concessions – a suggestion initially made by Raiffa (1982) to signal 
“approaching the limit; making large concession in the final offer; and using strategic delays. 
Employing agents in negotiations could serve the purposes of simulation and training of human 
negotiators, as well as for the automation of negotiations per se. For example, Traum et al. (2003) 
developed agent-based system, which employed negotiations for simulation-based training with 
application to peace-keeping situations. Lin et al. (2014) designed two experiments to evaluate the 
effectiveness of negotiation training by agents. Their study tested three treatments: training of humans 
by other humans, training by automated agents, and letting humans to configure agents to negotiate on 
their behalf. The negotiation tasks involved job candidate negotiations and the coordination game. The 
findings indicate that use of agents leads to better development of negotiations skills as opposed to use 
of humans as trainers. 
There have been past experimental studies involving human and agents in exchange settings 
focusing on objective as well as subjective aspects of negotiations. An early experimental work 
matching humans with agent counterparts was reported by Byde et al. (2003). A salesperson agent that 
employed persuasion and negotiation techniques while negotiating product price with a customer has 
  
been described in Huang and Lin (2007). Persuasion took place through customer-agent dialogue with 
the use of pre-defined arguments organized as a tree. Price was the single negotiated issue. The findings 
suggested that persuasion increased buyers’ product valuation and willingness to pay.  
Haim et al. (2012) have found that negotiating agents’ performance could be improved when the 
opponent’s cultural background was taken into account in designing agent’s tactics. Their study 
involved subjects from the US and the Middle East. de Melo et al. (2011) examined the effects of 
agents’ expression of emotions on the negotiator’s concession behavior. In this study, human subjects 
were paired up with agents, which expressed anger, neutrality, or happiness during negotiations using 
both verbal and non-verbal expression mode. They found that “angry” agents were able to gain more 
concessions from the human opponents, than the “happy” ones. 
Bosse and Jonker (2005) conducted an experiment to compare the performance of agents with that of 
humans in agent-human negotiations. Their findings indicated that humans achieved higher results in 
regards with the individual outcomes, while in agent-involved negotiations fairness of deals was higher. 
Vahidov et al. (2014) have investigated effects of using various agent negotiation tactics in experiments 
with human subjects. In these bilateral negotiation experiments involving sale of computers, five 
different concession-making styles were used: competing, linear, conceding, competing-then-conceding, 
and tit-for-tat. Agents acted as sellers while humans were assigned a buyer’s role. A control group on 
the seller side included human subjects. The results revealed that most agent types outperformed human 
“colleagues” in terms of utility of the achieved agreement, and the agreement rate. Competing agents 
achieved the highest utility levels, while conceding agents had the highest number of agreements. In 
Vahidov et al. (2012a), agents were employed in multi-bilateral negotiation settings. Here, the 
negotiation task featured a procurement scenario with a single buyer and three sellers. Buyer were given 
a task of awarding a single contract to one of the sellers based on simultaneous negotiations with all 
three counterparts. While most of the participants were human subjects, agents were present in some of 
  
the seller groups. The results showed that conceding agents achieved higher agreement rates than 
humans, while competing ones failed to win any contract. 
In order to get more thorough insights into agent-human negotiations, it is important to investigate 
possible impacts of negotiation task complexity. In particular, task complexity may influence 
negotiation outcomes, and user assessments of the system. From the general perspective of information 
systems, the task-technology fit (TTF) model posits that higher task complexity negatively affects the fit 
between the task at hand and the technology used to perform the task (Goodhue, 1995; Goodhue and 
Thompson, 1995). Furthermore, lower fit leads to lower individual performance. As applied to 
negotiations, this means that higher task complexity would hinder positive outcomes, such as agreement 
rates.  
User assessments of the systems are critical for the intended usage of the system as posited by 
technology acceptance model (TAM). Perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use are the key 
variables influencing intention to use (Davis, 1989; Davis et al., 1989). In Dishaw and Strong (1999) a 
model unifying both TAM and TTF has been proposed. Therefore, the aforementioned assessment 
variables, together with task complexity are important factors that could influence the actual acceptance 
of the online negotiation systems. Hence, they have been included in the current study.  
Past research on the effects of negotiation task complexity in agent-human negotiations is scarce. A 
study investigating the impacts of conflict-handling style and task complexity while using negotiation 
support systems had been reported in (Jain and Solomon, 2000). The authors hypothesized that face-to-
face groups would experience greater satisfaction with the outcome and more favorable perceptions of 
the group process than NSS-supported groups in complex negotiation tasks. In another study, 
experiments with agent-supported negotiations revealed that human negotiators using agents as advisors 
performed better in complex (involving a higher number of issues) tasks than unassisted human 
negotiators (Vahidov et al., 2013). 
  
The current study looks to evaluate the impacts of agent negotiation tactics and task complexity on 
the negotiation outcomes and assessments. The complexity of negotiation task is reflected in the effort 
and time spent by negotiators. These can be influenced by such factors as number and positions of the 
parties involved, and the number of issues included in the negotiation process. In this work the 
complexity is operationalized by manipulating number of issues, as it was done in Vahidov et al. (2013). 
Higher number of issues significantly increase the number of possible offers, leading to increased time 
and effort. Thus, on one hand, increasing number of issues leads to more room for maneuver, and 
potentially for higher propensity towards making an agreement. On the other hand, higher task 
complexity results in a higher cognitive effort, which might discourage human negotiators and push 
them towards terminating negotiations before the agreement could be reached.  
In this work, we investigate the performance of agent and user negotiators, as well as users’ 
perceptions of the system influenced by the agents’ tactics and the complexity of the negotiation task. 
The key outcome variables include the agreement rate, and the utility of the agreements. The assessment 
variables include perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use of the system. Negotiation task 
complexity is manipulated by varying the number of issues involved in the negotiation process. We 
anticipate that there will be an interaction effect between task complexity and tactics, since in conceding 
tactics complexity may have a smaller impact on the outcomes than in competing tactics. 
    
3. NEGOTIATION SYSTEM 
In order to conduct the experiments, an ENS that facilitates the creation and deployment of 
negotiating agents was used. The system architecture is shown in Figure 1. Human negotiators can 
interact with the system and view and make offers. The offer exchange is managed by the negotiation 
engine, which can work in both synchronous and asynchronous mode. The engine runs one of the 
negotiation cases retrieved from the case library. These cases are prepared by the administrator and they 
  
feature negotiation tasks, including description of the issues involved. While making decisions human 
negotiators may be supported by the preference modeling module. The model calculates the utility of a 
given offer based on the specified preferences. In our case the preference structure for the human 
participants was pre-set by the experimenters in order to minimize the extraneous variation. 
Agents can be created and equipped with a negotiation tactic (henceforth the terms “agent tactic” 
and “agent type” will be used interchangeably). The tactics toolbox contains both time- and behavior- 
dependent tactics, and it can be expanded to include new types of tactics. Time-dependent tactics used in 
the experiments allow the human principal to specify the shape of the curve defining the manner in 
which target utility changes with time. The curves used in the experiments will be described in the 
subsequent section. An agent uses given tactic in order to generate offers at any given time. It uses 
preference modeling module to calculate utility of the offers.   
 
 
Figure 1. System architecture 
 
The operation of the negotiation agent is shown in Figure 2. The agent becomes active at the 
specified day and time and sends out an initial offer that best suits its specified preferences. The issues 
in the offer may include both continuous (e.g., price), as well as categorical values (e.g., “call 
forwarding” option). Subsequently, the agent stays dormant for a time that has a specified period plus, 
optionally, a random component (the random part can be added to avoid being detected as a “machine” 
  
by the opponents), and then checks negotiation status. If the opponent has accepted the previously 
submitted offer, the negotiation terminates.    
If the negotiation is in progress, the agent checks if there have been any new offers by the 
counterpart. In the absence of new offers, the agent becomes dormant again until the next check point in 
time. If an offer from the opponent has been submitted, the agent examines it and calculates its utility 
level. The utility is calculated using weighted sum of individual issue values and it varies from 0 (worst) 
to 100 (best): 











Here,  is the overall utility of a given offer o, 	
 is the utility of the value v of issue i in offer 
o, and  is a weight for issue i in calculating the total utility of an offer. For each value of each 
negotiation issue, its utility level is specified. This could be done by using mapping for discrete (e.g., 
“data plan”), as well as continuous (e.g., “price”) issues. The issue value utilities and weights are 
different for the buyers and the sellers. For instance, for sellers (agents in our study) higher price 
translates into higher utility, while for the buyers (humans) the opposite is true.   
Agent uses tactics in order to set the target utility level. If the utility of the received offer exceeds the 
target value at a given time, the agent accepts the offer and the negotiation session terminates. 
Otherwise, the agent generates a new offer. In doing so the agent takes the opponent’s latest offer and 
tries to modify it, so that the utility is brought to the desired level. Since the agent starts with the 
opponent’s offer, there is a good chance that the new offer will be similar to that of the opponent. This is 
in line with the “smart” strategy proposed by Faratin et al. (2002) looking to minimize the distance 
between the newly generated offer and the opponent’s last offer. The agent randomly picks issues and 
  
makes random changes to their values (in an iterative improvement, or “hill climbing” fashion) until the 
utility of the trial offer is within the allowed distance from the target utility level. When such an offer is 




Figure 2. Agent’s algorithm 
 
4. NEGOTIATION SETUP 
The subjects were recruited from university students enrolled in an online course. A negotiation case 
was developed with the consideration of the subject’s familiarity level. The case featured a sale of a 
mobile phone plan. Most students are well aware of the issues involved in such plans. Two types of 
cases were included: a simple one and a complex one. The simple case involved the following issues: 
price, regular air time, extra air time, text messaging, and data. The buyers and sellers were given 
  
different weights for these issues according to their importance levels. Figure 3 shows the screenshot for 
the setup of the simple case.  
In order to calculate the total utility of the offer, the issues were assigned different weights. These 
weights would be used in an additive utility function for calculating the degree of attractiveness of a 
given offer. Agents would use this information in order to generate offers and to decide on the 
acceptability of the received counter-offers. The complex case additionally included call display, 
voicemail, call waiting, conference call, and call forwarding. (See Figure 4.) 
 
Figure 3. Set-up of the simple case 
 
 
Figure 4. Setup of the complex case 
  
Four different time-depending tactics were used in the experiments. These included: competing, 
conceding, competing-then-conceding, and conceding-then-competing tactics. Figures 5 to 8 show the 
concession schedules for these tactics (the off-curve dots allow the user to set the shapes of the curves 
by dragging).  
 
Figure 5. Competing schedule 
 




Figure 7. Conceding-then-competing schedule 
 
Figure 8. Competing-then-conceding schedule 
Competing agents tend to make smaller concessions in terms of utility of generated offers in the 
beginning of the negotiation period. However, as they approach the end of the period, they start making 
larger concessions in search of an agreement. Conceding agents tend to make large concessions in the 
very beginning of the negotiation period in search of a quick agreement. This represents the case where 
a seller is anxious to sell the plan. Conceding agents are not expected to have high utility deals, although 
they are expected to make more agreements than competing agents. 
  
Two remaining tactics represent the mix of the above two schedules. The guidelines for agent tactic 
design mentioned earlier (Yang and Singhal, 2009) suggested making a tough initial offer, followed by 
making monotonously decreasing concessions, and making a large concession in the final offer. The 
conceding-competing schedule mimics this sort of behavior. It starts with the tough offer, then makes 
monotonously decreasing concessions to signal to the opponent the vicinity of its reservation level. If the 
deal is still not made midway through the negotiation period, the agent starts making large concessions 
in order to grab the deal. 
The competing-conceding tactic starts out tough in the hopes of grabbing high-value deals. 
However, if agreement is not made in the initial phases, the agent switches to the conceding mode. In 
this way, the agent could combine the benefits of both competing and competing tactics.  The tactics for 
the agents are modeled using Bezier curves. 
Treatments involved randomly pairing up the subjects with various types of agents in a simple or 
complex task as described above. The experiment was conducted on the web, whereby subjects could 
perform their tasks from any location in an asynchronous mode during a two-day period. The subjects 
were invited to join the negotiations via email containing the link to the system. They could choose to 
terminate the negotiation at any time without reaching an agreement. 
 
5. RESULTS 
A total of 754 subjects registered for the experiment and completed the experimental task. A data 
cleaning procedure was conducted to select only those subjects who made more than one offer in order 
to filter out the cases where subjects did not take the experimental task seriously. After filtering the 
number of subjects dropped to 368. Based on these retained observations, 262 negotiations (71%) ended 
up in an agreement, while 106 (29%) dyads did not make an agreement.  
The agreement rate for the simple negotiation task setting was 75.5%, while for the complex task it 
  
was 65.4%. Thus, in the simple task, the agreements were more frequent. On one hand, a larger number 
of issues should have given negotiators more space for “maneuvering” in negotiations, therefore leading 
to a higher likelihood of making an agreement. On the other hand, the complexity of the task has taxed 
the cognitive capabilities of the human participants and required higher cognitive effort. In our setup, the 
simple task included five issues, while the complex one featured ten. The fairly large number of issues 
probably resulted in the burden of cognitive effort outweighing the benefits of a larger search space for 
the potential agreements. This seems to have been the reason why fewer agreements were made in the 
complex task. Table 1 displays the agreement rates for the four tactics overall, and for simple vs. 
complex tasks separately. 
 Task Simple Complex 
Agreement No Yes Rate No Yes Rate 
Tactic Competing 27 36 57.1% 24 23 48.9% 
Competing-Conceding 9 22 71.0% 10 15 60.0% 
Conceding-Competing 6 31 83.8% 15 35 70.0% 
Conceding 10 71 87.7% 5 29 85.3% 
Total 52 160 75.5% 54 102 65.4% 
Table 1. Agreement rates for different agent tactics 
The chi-square test for independence based on the number of agreements has yielded the value of 
9.707 (p-value = 0.021). Therefore, there is a significant difference between various complexity-tactic 
combinations in terms of agreement rates. As one can see from the table, the highest agreement rate was 
achieved by the conceding agents, and the lowest one by the competing agents. This is not surprising 
given the concession schedules of these agents. The other two agent tactics fell in between the extremes 
in terms of agreement rate. Conceding-competing agents have made more agreements than the 
competing-conceding ones. Thus, apparently the guideline mentioned earlier, that is “signaling 
approaching the limit” seems to have had a positive impact in terms of the likelihood of an agreement. 
Task complexity does not seem to have a large effect on the agreement rate for the conceding agents. 
This makes sense, as the agents using this tactic would concede so quickly that agreements were reached 
early regardless of the complexity of the task. It does seem to have had a larger impact when an agent 
  
was of the competing type. The implication here is that competing agents are more likely to make an 
agreement in simpler tasks.  
Table 2 shows the average utilities achieved by sellers (agents) and buyers (humans). For the simple 
task, the average utility per one seller is the highest for the competing tactic followed by the conceding-
competing tactic. For the complex task, interestingly, agents employing the conceding tactic have 
achieved highest utility values. Overall, these three strategies yielded much higher utility, compared to 
the competing-conceding tactic. Therefore, in terms of expected utility of agreements our findings 
suggest that competing agents should be employed in simple negotiation tasks, while conceding agents 
better suit complex tasks. Nonetheless, conceding-competing agents perform fairly well regardless of the 
task complexity. On the buyer side, agent’s conceding tactic generated highest average utilities in both 
simple and complex tasks. Competing tactic resulted in the lowest average utilities in both tasks. 
Average Utility Seller Buyer 
Task Simple Complex Total Simple Complex Total 
Tactic Competing 46.52 30.12 38.32   4.90   9.15   7.03 
Competing-Conceding 37.80 27.80 32.80 13.42 18.48 15.95 
Conceding-Competing 45.38 34.90 40.14 25.46 13.31 19.38 
Conceding 41.24 39.20 40.22 32.69 34.09 33.39 
Overall 42.74 33.01 37.87 19.12 18.76 18.94 
Table 2. Average utility per seller and buyer 
Next, we analyze the agent performance in terms of the agent sellers’ and human buyers’ utilities of 
the achieved agreements. For this analysis only the instances where the agreement was achieved were 
included in the calculation of the utilities. First, we examined the agreement utilities on both the seller 
and the buyer sides. The results, reported in Table 3 show that, overall, agent sellers achieved higher 
final utility (58.97) in simple task settings than in complex settings (50.93). Conversely, human buyers 
achieved higher utility in more complex tasks. Also, all types of agent sellers received higher utilities 
than human buyers. Overall, competing agents achieved highest utility agreements, followed by the 
conceding-competing, competing-conceding, and lastly, conceding agents. Task complexity has the 
largest impact for competing agents, medium impact for the conceding-competing and competing-
  
conceding agents, and virtually no impact for the conceding agents.  
We have developed a general linear model incorporating agent tactic and task complexity level for 
predicting the obtained utilities of agent sellers and human buyers. Number of offers was included as a 
co-variate as it reflected negotiators’ effort. The results of the multivariate tests of the general linear 
model are shown in Table 4, and the between-subject effects are provided in Table 5. The findings 
suggest that task complexity (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.011), agent tactic (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.000), and 
number of offers (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.000), were all significant. Furthermore, the interaction of task 
complexity and agent tactic, as expected, was also significant (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.004). The 
decomposed effect of the independent variables was further checked. Number of offers had a significant 
effect only on human buyers’ utilities (p = 0.000). Agent tactic had significant effects on both human 
buyers’ and agent sellers’ utilities (p = 0.000). Similarly, task complexity had significant effects on both 
human buyers’ (p = 0.011) and agent sellers’ utilities (p = 0.013). The interaction of task complexity and 
agent type had a significant effect only on human buyers’ utilities (p = 0.002). 
Table 3. Average utilities when agreements were reached  
 Average Agreement Utility Seller Buyer 
Task Simple Complex Total Simple Complex Total 
Tactic Competing 81.42 61.55 71.49 8.57 18.70 13.64 
Competing-Conceding 53.26 46.33 49.80 18.91 30.81 24.86 
Conceding-Competing 54.16 49.86 52.01 30.39 19.01 24.70 
Conceding 47.05 45.96 46.51 37.29 39.96 38.63 
Overall 58.97 50.93 54.95 23.79 27.12 24.46 
 
Table 4. The results of multivariate tests of the general linear model 
Effect Wilks' Lambda F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept 0.199 508.46 2 252 0.000 
Number of offers 0.914   11.85 2 252 0.000 
Agent tactic 0.714   15.44 6 504 0.000 
Case complexity 0.965     4.56 2 252 0.011 
Agent tactic * Case complexity 0.078     3.27 6 502 0.004 
 
In order to develop a deeper understanding of the effects of agent tactic and task complexity a set of 
pair-wise comparisons have been conducted. The groups included in the comparisons and the testing 
results are reported in Table 6. This analysis includes those negotiation instances where agreements 
  
were reached. The instances are divided into 8 groups formed by four agent tactics and two levels of 
task complexity. Each group is assigned a number. The comparisons of paired groups focused on either 
sellers’ or buyers’ utilities using Mann-Whitney U tests. Pairs of mean ranks for each comparison along 
with the corresponding p-values are shown in the table cells. The significant results are highlighted in 
bold. 
Table 5. The results of between-subject effects of the general linear model 
 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df F Sig. 
Corrected model Seller Final Utility 36,017.3  8     7.04 0.000 Buyer Final Utility 37,130.5  8   16.06 0.000 
Intercept Seller Final Utility 32,775.1  1 512.28 0.000 Buyer Final Utility 37,809.1  1  130.81 0.000 
Number of offers Seller Final Utility      952.7  1     1.49 0.224 Buyer Final Utility    6,691.1  1    23.2 0.000 
Agent tactic Seller Final Utility 23,598.9  3    12.3 0.000 Buyer Final Utility 25,321.7  3    29.2 0.000 
Case complexity Seller Final Utility   4,216.2  1     6.6 0.011 Buyer Final Utility   1,812.7  1     6.3 0.013 
Agent tactic *  
Case complexity 
Seller Final Utility   3,187.4  3     1.7 0.176 
Buyer Final Utility    4,395.5  3     5.1 0.002 
Error Seller Final Utility     161,868.2 253 -  - Buyer Final Utility 73,124.8 253 -  - 
Total Seller Final Utility     979,616.8 262 -  - 
Buyer Final Utility     298,917.0 262 -  - 
Corrected total Seller Final Utility     197,885.5 261 -  - 
Buyer Final Utility     110,255.4 261 -  - 
 
The results suggest that agent tactic plays a more significant role in influencing sellers’ utilities in 
simple, rather than in complex settings. There are four pair comparisons of sellers’ average utilities (1 
vs. 2, 1 vs. 3, 1 vs. 4, and 3 vs. 4) that are significant in simple settings. In contrast, there is only one pair 
(5 vs. 6), which is significant in complex settings. Particularly, seller agents with the competing tactic 
were likely to achieve significantly higher utilities. The competing tactic featuring in four pair 
comparisons (1 vs. 2, 1 vs. 3, 1 vs. 4, and 5 vs. 6) in both simple and complex settings led to 
significantly higher utilities than other tactics did. 
The findings also suggest that competing and competing-conceding tactics resulted in lower buyers’ 
utilities in simple settings as opposed to the complex ones. The results of five pair comparisons of 
  
buyers’ utilities (1 vs. 2, 1 vs. 3, 1 vs. 4, 2 vs. 3, and 2 vs. 4) turned out to be significant. At the same 
time, the effects of competing and conceding-competing tactics on buyers’ utility are less significant 
under the complex settings.  
Task complexity had a stronger influence on both buyers’ and sellers’ utilities when agent sellers 
used the competing tactic. The comparisons of the pair 1 vs. 5 on both sellers’ and buyers’ utilities 
shows a significant result. Additionally, task complexity had a significant influence on buyers’ utilities 
when agent sellers adopted competing-conceding and conceding-competing tactics. The comparisons 2 
vs. 6 and 3 vs. 7 on buyers’ utilities also show significant effects. 
Table 6. Pair-wise comparisons of buyers’ and seller’s utilities  
Groups for comparisons Task Complexity 
 
 Simple Complex 
Agent Tactic Competing 1 5 
 
Competing-Conceding 2 6 
 
Conceding-Competing 3 7 
 
Conceding 4 8 
 
In Simple Task Seller Utility Buyer Utility 
 
























3   60.81/47.44 
(0.036) 
3   45.65/54.06 
(.186) 
























7   34.33/30.29 
(.388) 
7   23.77/43.03 
(.000) 
Between Task 1 vs. 5 36.32/20.11 
(.000) 
 





2 vs. 6 19.89/17.70 
(.551) 





3 vs. 7 34.98/32.19 
(.554) 





4 vs. 8 51.05/49.16 
(.767) 




As mentioned earlier, the current study is largely exploratory as little prior work has been done on 
the assessment of agent-human negotiations with different levels of task complexity. The interactions 
between agent tactics, task complexity, and system features make it difficult to develop strong 
  
hypotheses. For example, larger number of issues, while allowing more space for potential agreements 
can be counterweighed by the effort involved. We have conducted a survey among the participants to 
obtain insights into the user assessments that could serve as a basis for future research. Survey questions 
were asked about two aspects of user experience including perceived ease of use (PEU) and perceived 
usefulness (PU), using a seven-point Likert scale. (See Table 7.) In total, we have obtained 229 complete 
responses from the participants. Most of the participants were between 19 and 21 old. Other 
demographic statistics of the participants are shown in Tables 8 and 9. The total number of respondents 
is smaller than the number of the participants, because some subjects completed the experimental task, 
but chose not to fill out the survey questionnaire. 
Table 7. Questionnaire items 
Aspect Survey questions 
PEU I think that I was skillful at using THE SYSTEM. 
Learning to use THE SYSTEM was easy for me. 
I found it easy to get THE SYSTEM to do what I want it to do. 
PU I found THE SYSTEM useful to configure my mobile plan. 
Using THE SYSTEM would enable me to accomplish purchasing a mobile plan more quickly. 
Using THE SYSTEM would increase the effective use of my time in purchasing a mobile plan. 
        (“THE SYSTEM” is used to replace the actual system name.) 
Table 8. Demographic allocation given task complexity levels 
  Task Sum 
 
 Simple Complex  
Gender Female 86 34 120 
 
Male 73 36 109 
Ethnic Background African 6 5 11 
 




10 8 18 
 
European (West) 19 11 30 
 
Latin American 10 3 13 
 
Middle Eastern 16 6 22 
 
North American 54 25 79 
 
Oceanian 1 0 1 
 









Table 9. Demographic allocation given agent tactics 







Gender Female 42 14 24 40 120 
 
Male 35 20 18 36 109 
Ethnic Background African 4 2 3 2 11 
 
Asian 11 5 9 16 41 
 
European (East/Russian) 9 0 3 6 18 
 
European (West) 9 4 6 11 30 
 
Latin American 2 2 2 7 13 
 
Middle Eastern 8 5 4 5 22 
 
North American 29 12 13 25 79 
 
Oceanian 0 0 0 1 1 
 
Other 5 4 2 3 14 
 
The results of the exploratory factor analysis using PEU and PU items showed that the items loaded 
on two factors. The reliability of these two factors have been checked using Cronbach’s alpha, which 
had values of 0.91 for PU and 0.806 for PEU. The sum scores of the items measuring PU and PEU were 
used in further analysis.  
Three tests using general linear model have been conducted. The overall effects of the test results 
(Wilks’ Lambda) are reported in Table 10. Test 1 was conducted on the dataset including all instances. 
The scores of the two constructs were used as dependent variables. Task complexity and agent tactic 
were the independent variables, while number of offers was used as a covariate. Overall, the effects of 
number of offers (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.004) was significant (at 0.05 significance level). Agent tactic and 
task complexity by themselves did not exhibit significant effects on the constructs. However, they had a 
significant interaction effect (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.033). Test 2 was conducted using only the instances 
that featured an agreement. As one can see, here only the interaction of agent type and task complexity 
was significant (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.009). Test 3 was conducted using the instances that had an 
agreement, however, it used utility achieved by the buyers as a covariate instead of the number of offers. 
The results of the three tests show that task complexity and agent tactic had a significant interaction 
effect (Wilk’s Lambda = 0.033, 0.009, and 0.018). 
  
Table 10. Overall effects on subjective assessments 




# Offers Task Complexity  
* Agent Tactic 
Test 1 (all instances) 0.393 0.145  0.004 0.033 
Test 2 (with agreement) 0.316 0.415  0.080 0.009 
Test 3 (with agreement) 0.230 0.252 0.062  0.018 
 
The decomposed effects of the independent variables on each of the subjective assessment variables 
are reported in Table 11. Task complexity and agent tactics had a significant interaction effect on PEU 
in the three tests (p = 0.003, 0.001, 0.002). The number of offers had significant direct effect on PU (p = 
0.002 and 0.027) in its relevant tests (Test 1 and 2). Achieved utility had a significant direct effect on 
PEU in Test 3. 
Table 11. Decomposed effects on subjective assessment 
Decomposed effect Agent 
Tactic 
Task Complexity Number of Offers Achieved Utility Task Complexity  
* Agent Tactic 
PEU Test 1 0.840 0.182 0.918  0.003 
Test 2 0.775 0.484 0.525  0.001 
Test 3 0.315 0.552  0.019 0.002 
PU Test 1 0.188 0.441 0.002  0.453 
Test 2 0.298 0.186 0.027  0.415 
Test 3 0.609 0.097  0.220 0.412 
 
The above results suggest that agent tactic by itself does not have a significant effect on any of the 
dependent variables. This finding is compatible with a previous study (Vahidov et al., 2014) that 
included the subjective variables used in the current work as a subset.  
As our primary interest is on the interaction between task complexity and agent tactic, this effect is 
further examined. The interaction effect on PEU is significant in all three tests. The means of the score 
of PEU are reported in Table 12. These results look surprising at the first glance. When negotiating with 
a conceding agent, users perceived system easier to use in simple settings as compared with the complex 
ones. However, paired with competing agents, subjects felt the system was easier to use in the complex 
negotiation setting. This finding sounds counter-intuitive and requires explanation. We believe, that this 
is due to the fact that concessions made by a competing agents on ten issues are less visible than those 
made by the same type of agent in simpler tasks. Therefore, subjects may be perceiving 
  
competing/complex setting more as a fixed-offer (take it or leave it) mechanism, rather than negotiation. 
The former is perceived as easier to use rather than latter, since negotiations involve more cognitive 
effort. 
Table 12. Effects on perceived ease of use 
Agent tactic Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
Simple Complex Simple Complex Simple Complex 
Competing 9.57 10.87 9.07 11.85 8.92 11.36 
Competing-Conceding 10.22 10.36 10.06 11.80 9.65 11.06 
Conceding-Competing 11.42 9.88 11.41 10.36 10.69 9.93 




The purpose of the current work was to explore the effects of agent negotiation tactics and 
negotiation task complexity on agent performance and human assessments in electronic negotiations. As 
suspected, the agent negotiation tactic’s interaction with negotiation task complexity has significant 
effects on both objective, as well as some subjective variables, although the actual direction of these 
effects were not trivial. The results suggest that competing agents made fewer agreements and had 
considerably lower agreement utilities in complex tasks compared to their performance in simple tasks. 
For the conceding agents there was not much difference between the complex and simple tasks. This is 
because these agents conceded fairly fast and many agreements were made at lower utility levels 
regardless of the task complexity. 
Interesting insights were obtained while analyzing subjective assessments of the human participants. 
While agent tactic by itself did not have much impact on the subjective variables, its interaction with 
task complexity did prove to be significant for perceived ease of use. Interestingly, subjects negotiating 
with competing agents in complex settings found the system easier to use, than those paired up with the 
same kind of agents in simple settings. In other words, subjects facing “tougher” agents in more 
“difficult” circumstances reported higher ease of use. In our view, this is due to the fact that concessions 
made by competing agents on a multitude of issues are less noticeable by the subjects, and they perceive 
  
the interaction more as a fixed-offer mechanism. The fixed offer mechanism is perceived as easier to use 
than true negotiation exchange as more cognitive effort is required in the latter case.  
The primary contribution of this paper is in the finding that the negotiation task complexity 
(represented by the number of issues) does impact the outcomes. Furthermore, the choice of the agent 
tactic has an impact on the extent of the influence of complexity on the agreement rates, as well as on 
the agreement utilities. To our knowledge, this is the first study of software agent – human negotiations 
investigating the interaction between agent tactics and task complexity. 
The paper has important practical implications for websites that allow customers to make their own 
offers. While we have used the case involving smartphone plans, other example possible applications are 
selling vacation packages, or used cars featuring on dealership sites. Our findings indicate that overall, 
making offers overly complex (i.e., including the multitude of issues) does not lead to improved 
agreement rate. In tougher economic conditions and under increased competition more conceding tactics 
should be followed as they lead to a larger number of agreements. When competitive pressures are lower 
and the conditions are milder, competing tactics can be employed as they lead to higher agreement 
utilities. In this case, however, simpler offers (including fewer issues) are more likely to lead to more 
agreements. Also, conceding-then-competing strategy showed a good overall performance as it can be 
utilized when conditions are not overly favorable or unfavorable. 
One limitation of the current research is that experiment was performed online. This reduced the 
potential control over the subject behavior in the experiments. Furthermore, the time span allocated for 
the experiment (two days) might have affected the results. Future in-lab studies can be performed to re-
asses the key findings of the study. Furthermore, future research could be directed to study effects with 
varying levels of complexity. For example, treatments could include single issue, three issues, five 
issues, and ten issues. Additionally, consideration of human subject characteristics, such as conflict 
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• Experiments involving negotiations between human subjects and software agents have been conducted. 
• Agents used various concession-making tactics. 
• Negotiation case featured purchase of a mobile phone plan. 
• Simple case involved five issues, while complex case had ten issues to negotiate over. 
• Results suggest significant effects of case complexity and concession-making tactic interaction on objective outcomes, as well as 
subjective assessments of negotiations. 
 
